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Abstract 
The academic sector has been faced with strong monopolization tendencies occurring in the academic 
publisher market in recent years. A countermeasure from the demand-side has been the formation of 
procurement consortia by academic libraries which are intended to reduce costs and simultaneously 
optimizing the availability of academic journals in order to sufficiently serve their customers (i.e. fac-
ulty and students).  
The objective of this paper is to determine cost-minimal structures for library consortia. We develop a 
non-linear and binary optimization model which is solved by applying a genetic algorithm (GA). The 
paper demonstrates the effectiveness of the GA by applying it to a real-world problem in the German 
academic e-journals market. The results show that the found solution results in costs that are approxi-
mately 30 % lower than the current regional-based solution. 
 
Keywords: electronic journals, library consortia, procurement costs, optimization, genetic algorithm 
Introduction 
In recent years, strong monopolies in the market for electronic information resources in the academic sector have led to 
the formation of consortia of university libraries and other academic institutions. The goal of consortia formation is to 
increase the bargaining power of the libraries with respect to the publishers [Hirshon 1999, McCabe 2002, Beimborn et al. 
2004]. 
There are three major player in the market for scientific electronic journals: (1) the scientists as producer and consumer of 
information, (2) the libraries who purchase the literature and make it available to the scientist and, (3) the publishers and 
aggregators who collect, bundle, and sell articles and journals to the libraries [Odlyzko 1997, Varian 1996]. Characteristic 
of the current situation is that the publicly funded libraries have to re-purchase information from the publishers which has 
also been produced before by public funding [Degkwitz/Andermann 2003, Mays-Smith et al. 2004, Varian 1996, Walport 
2003]. The libraries, whose objective is to provide an information supply as complete as possible to researchers and 
teachers, are confronted with a problematic development which is described as a “crisis” in the supply of scientific infor-
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mation (so-called the serial crisis) [Gibson 2003, Mays-Smith et al. 2004, Odlyzko 1999, Walport 2003]: especially large, 
commercial publishers, such as Elsevier or Springer, who publish high-reputation journals, can raise the prices for their 
journals without suffering any loss of orders and subscriptions. This is due to the lack of competition along highly special-
ized journals and the lack of demand elasticity regarding the “need to know” scientific information products [McCabe 
2002, Beimborn et al. 2004]. 
To tackle this problem, the publicly funded libraries have organized themselves in procurement consortia to bundle and 
increase their bargaining power. In Germany, due to the funding of universities by the states, most of these consortia are 
organized along the borders of the existing states; procurement cooperation with a thematic focus is not common 
[Degkwitz/Andermann 2003]. Currently, German academic libraries are primarily organized in 16 consortia with around 
90 participating libraries [Reinhardt 2003]. The consortia differ in size, in their importance as negotiators, in their legal 
form, in their financial base and in their human resources. 
The goal of this paper is to develop a heuristic optimization method that finds cost-minimal consortia structures for librar-
ies. The costs of the libraries depend on the underlying consortia structure and consist of procurement costs and adminis-
trative costs, which result from managing the procurement process and coordinating consortia. The optimization is done 
from a centralized perspective. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: section 2 describes the current pricing models for library consortia. Section 3 
describes the combinatorial optimization model, which is an enhancement of [Beimborn et al. 2004]. Due to the fact that a 
basic form of this model is already published, this part of the paper is held consciously compact. In section 3 we develop a 
genetic algorithm (GA) to solve the problem and to deliver optimal consortia structures. Section 4 describes two existing 
German library procurement consortia (covering 20 German libraries in two states) and applies the GA to find an im-
proved consortia structure. The results show that the found consortia structure can reduce the costs by approximately 
30 %.  
Current Pricing Models 
The currently available pricing models for procuring electronic journals by academic libraries are fixed-price calculations 
based on existing subscriptions to paper-based journals and pay per view (PPV). 
Subscription-based Fixed Price Calculation 
We explain the pricing model based on subscribed print-media (surcharge model) which is commonly used for electronic 
journals [Anglada/Comellas 2002] by an example: The monetary amount of subscriptions in the Hessian library consor-
tium (HeBIS)1 for the print journal package (541 scientific journals) of one large publisher was around € 1,846,423 (net) 
in 2005 including multiple subscriptions (by the different consortium members) of the same journal. The license costs to 
access the electronic versions of these journals was 15% (€ 276,963 (net)) and included cross access. Cross access means 
that consorted libraries are allowed to electronically access issues they do not have physically in stock at their own loca-
tion, as long as one of the consortium partners has. Therefore, the basic cost for subscribed print-media does include the 
fee for the printed version of the journal and an option for electronic usage. Exercising this option causes additional costs 
amounting to the surcharge. Pure electronic access without subscribing to the printed versions of the journal is usually not 
possible, because publishers try to circumvent the drop-down of the profitable print market2.
In general, the cost base for consortia is calculated on multiple print subscriptions, while libraries that act alone have only 
to take into account one copy of the relevant journal to determine their costs.  
 
1 Hesse is the fifth largest German state. There is one consortium, which consists of 12 libraries in 2005. 
2 This leads to the fact that libraries subscribe to paper-based journals to get electronic access, but refuse to get the printed version to save storage costs. 
Empirical surveys showed that demand regarding printed journals by students and researchers almost disappears, if the electronic version is offered. 
[Keller 2002]
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Pay Per View 
In contrast to the fixed-price surcharge model presented above, the PPV model assumes that every single access to a com-
plete journal article (“full text”) is charged with a specific amount [Tenopir 2003]. 
Model Description 
The following model [Beimborn et al. 2004] describes the problem of finding cost-minimal consortia structures. The goal 
of the optimization is to minimize the total costs (procurement costs and administrative costs over all libraries) for procur-
ing electronic journals. This optimal structure of the consortium must be found separately for the journal portfolio of each 
publisher, i.e. libraries form different consortia for negotiating with different publishers (as it can also be observed in real-
ity). In this paper, we only consider the journal portfolio of one particular publisher and determine the optimal consortia 
structure for procuring this portfolio. The optimization is done from a centralized perspective and individual incentives 
and goals of the several libraries are not considered. The total costs, which are minimized by the model, consist of all li-
braries’ procurement costs and their administrative costs, which result from managing the procurement process and from 
coordinating the consortia.  
The model is based on the following assumptions, which have partly simplifying character:  
1. The number of potential consortium members is known. 
2. Each library can only be a member of one consortium. 
3. The existing subscriptions of printed journals are known. 
4. The demand for every journal at every library is known or can be estimated adequately. 
5. The costs for print-subscriptions of each title are known. 
6. Every library offers each journal electronically, independently of any existing print-subscription. 
7. The surcharge for electronic access is known and identical for each journal published by a particular publisher. 
8. The licensing costs are lower for libraries that are not members of a consortium. 
9. For consortia, multiple subscriptions of the same title will be considered when calculating the cost base; if the library 
does not act as a consortium member only one subscription will be considered. 
10. Journals, which are not subscribed to in print, will be accounted for by PPV, if demanded electronically. The PPV fee 
is known and identical for every journal. 
11. The administrative costs show a convex progression, i.e. they increase super-proportionally with the number of con-
sortium participants from a specific consortia size. 
Procurement Costs 
The procurement costs as first part of the cost function are aggregated over all libraries and depend on the coordination 
form – stand-alone procurement or concerted procurement by a consortium. Furthermore, the costs depend on the sub-
scriptions that exist for printed journals. If one library holds a print subscription for a particular journal, none of the other 
consortium members have to pay PPV fees when accessing the electronic version (cross access). Libraries, which are not 
members of a consortium, have to pay the subscription fees for the printed journals (for one copy only) as well as pay-per-
view costs for journals, which are not in the library’s stock. 
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Equation 1: Procurement costs 
Equation 1 describes the calculation of the procurement costs. The decision variables and input parameters are shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Input parameters, decision variables, and indices for procurement costs 
input 
parame-
ters 
 = relative surcharge for consortia
for electronic access
  = relative surcharge  for 
 stand - alone acting for
 electronic access
ck
a = costs for a print subscription of 
 journal k per period
cv = fee per access (PPV)
dik = demand for journal k in library i
gik =
1 if library i has subscribed the 
 printed version of journal k
0 else




hik = number of printed copies of journal k
which are subscribed by library i at the
 beginning of the procurement period
 
decision 
variables 
zi =
1 if library i is member of a consortium
0 else



xij =
1 if library i is member of procurement 
 entity j
0 else




y jk =
1 if journal k is subscribed by at least 
 one member of procurement entity j
0 else




indices 
i = library index               i  I
j = procurement entity index       j  J
k = journal index              k  K
Variable zi is equal to one, if library i is member of a consortium; in this case the complete surcharge has to be paid. If it 
does not cooperate, zi is 0 and the surcharge  will be diminished by  (see 8th assumption).  
The level of the basic costs also depends on the coordination form. If library i acts on its own ( zi = 0) possible multiple 
copies of printed journals are not taken into account (the binary variable gik indicates if a (printed) journal k is in stock at 
library i). Otherwise (if the library is member of a consortium) all print subscriptions (including multiple copies of the 
same journal within the whole consortium) will be the basis for calculating the basic costs (number of copies (or only one) 
multiplied by the journal’s subscription fee ck
a .
To describe consortia in the model, we introduce an index j, which stands for procurement entities. These entities could 
either be libraries which act alone or consortia. The binary decision variable xij  describes whether library i is part of pro-
curement entity j in a solution, or not. If, for a particular j, only one xij  is equal to one, library i manages its procurement 
independently; in the other case it is member of a consortium. 
The last term of equation 1 models the PPV costs. If 0=jky , then the journal is subscribed to by none of the libraries in 
the considered consortium. In this case the demand has to be provided by paying for every access. 
 Administrative Costs 
Libraries also have administrative costs. These depend on the size of the libraries and consortia. We assume that libraries 
can be classified into three different sizes, associated with different levels of administrative costs. University libraries are 
classified as “large” libraries, while state libraries and technical universities’ libraries belong to the “medium” class. Li-
braries of universities of applied sciences (UAS) form the group of “small” libraries. 
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The administrative costs depend on the coordination form (stand-alone activity vs. consortium). Therefore, for each group 
of libraries two different administrative cost factors must be determined: cs
ads for acting alone and adcsc for being a con-
sortium member. The values for cs
ads were acquired by interviews with experts (Table 2). 
Table 2. Stand-alone administrative costs 
Library size Administrative costs per library,  
year, and contract (Csads) in € 
small library 1,250
medium-size library 2,500 
large library 3,750 
Next, the administrative costs for coordination in a consortium must be considered. It can be empirically shown that the 
average administrative costs per member in a consortium initially decrease with growing consortium size. But the more 
participants the consortium contains, the larger is the necessary coordination effort, so that the average cost outbalance the 
stand-alone administrative costs above a certain consortium size. 
To formalize this effect we use the consortia administrative cost coefficient ( adcsc ) and exponentiate the cumulated cost 
coefficients by a constant parameter . The resulting administrative cost function is given by Equation 2, the used vari-
ables and parameters are described in Table 3. 
 
( ) 
= == 

















+=
J
j
I
i
adc
iijj
I
i
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iijj cxucxuC
1
costs tiveadministra based consortia
1
alone-standfor  costs tiveadministra
1
tionAdministra
Network 1
44 344 2144 344 21

Equation 2: Total administrative costs of the network 
Table 3. Input parameters, decision variables, and indices for administrative costs 
input 
parame-
ters consortium aofmember if
i,library  offactor costs tiveadministra c
ilibrary  ofcosts tiveadministra alone-standc
1costs, tiveadministra consortial for exponent 
adc
i
ads
i
=
=
>=
decision 
variables 
u j =
1 if procurement entity j consists of more than one 
 library (i.e. a consortium then)
0 else




xij =
1 if library i is member of procurement entity j
0 else



Indices 
i = Iibrary index               i  I
j = procurement entity index       j  J
k = journal index              k  K
In a last step the consortia administrative costs parameters adcsc for the different libraries’ sizes must be estimated. We 
asked experts, at which consortium size sizes
* s small, medium, large{ }( )( ) – assumed that a consortium consists of 
libraries of the same size – the consortia administrative costs per member have the same level as the stand-alone adminis-
trative costs. 
 This break-even point was estimated as a critical consortium size of 10 large, 15 medium-size, or 25 small libraries. 
Given the cs
ads values and a hypothetic determination of  , the values of adcsc can be computed by Equation 3. 
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{ }large medium, small,s
size
csize
=c
s
ads
ssadc
s 

*
*
Equation 3: Estimation of consortial administrative cost factor 
Table 4 shows exemplary the administration cost coefficients for  =1.1.
Table 4. Consortial administrative costs ( =1.1)
Library size 
Administrative costs per library,  
year, and contract ( adcsc ) in €,  =1.1
small library 488
medium-size library 960 
large library 1439 
Using the presented cost functions, an optimization model can be developed that minimizes the aggregate costs and de-
termines the optimal consortia structure of the libraries.  
Model Formulation 
The aggregation of the cost functions leads to the model’s objective in Equation 4 (for variables declaration see Table 1 
and Table 3). The presented constraints ensure that all values of the variables are feasible. 
Constraint (4-2) ensures that every library becomes a member of exactly one procurement entity (stand-alone or member 
of exactly one consortium). (4-3) and (4-4) ensure the correct use of uj while the same for yjk and zi takes place in condi-
tions (4-5) and (4-6). xij, yjk and uj have to be declared as binary variables (4-7 and 4-9), while the other variable  (zi) im-
plicitly accept only boolean values, caused by the given constraint (4-6) and the impact of the minimization objective. In 
the following sections, the problem is denoted as Optimal Consortia Structure Problem (OCSP).
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(4 - 6) xiju j
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J
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(4 - 7) y jk  0,1{ } j  J,k  K
(4 - 8) xij  0,1{ } i  I, j  J
(4 - 9) u j  0,1{ } j  J
Equation 4: Optimal Consortia Structure Problem (OCSP) 
For developing an adequate solving algorithm it is necessary to determine the problem complexity. Due to the problem 
structure the developed optimization model can be classified as a combinatorial optimization problem [Papadimit-
riou/Steiglitz 1998]. Furthermore, it can be shown that the OCSP is NP-complete; therefore, larger problem instances can-
not be solved exactly within an appropriate amount of time. 
Such problems can be handled with the help of heuristic algorithms, which try to find “good” solutions within an accept-
able amount of time, but do not guarantee to find the best solution for a given problem [Garey/Johnson 1979]. 
Design of the Genetic Algorithm  
This section develops a GA to solve the OCSP. In a first step, the GA is applied to small example problems with known 
optimal solutions to evaluate its performance. In a second step, the GA is applied to a larger real-world problem. 
Genetic Representation 
Of great importance for the performance of a GA to solve a given problem is the used problem representation [Rothlauf 
2006]. For the OCSP, we do not represent the decision variables xij directly as a matrix of binaries xij but use instead a 
(much smaller) list of integers xi. Each solution contains I integers xi, where i  1,ዊ� ,I{ } and xi  1,ዊ� ,I{ }. I is the number 
of different libraries and also the maximum number of procurement entities that could be formed. 
Figure 1 illustrates this concept for a small example with six libraries. The integer at the i-th position indicates the number 
of the consortium the library i participates. In this example, libraries 1, 2, and 3 form the first consortium and libraries 4, 
5, and 6 form a second one.  
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Figure 1. Exemplary genetic representation of an individual 
Describing this solution with the binary decision variables xij used in Equation 4, the decision variables xij would take the 
following corresponding values: x11=1, x12=0, x21=1, x22=0, x31=1, x32=0, x41=0, x42=1, x51=0, x52=1, x61=0, and x62=1. 
Functionality of Genetic Algorithms 
Our GA follows classical GA design [Goldberg/Deb 1991] and iteratively applies search operators (recombination and 
mutation) to a population of individuals (solutions) until some termination criteria are met (Figure 2). 
 
Initialize population 
O Create initial solution 
O Evaluate initial solution 
Repeat until termination criteria 
O Select high-quality solutions by 
selection operator 
O Recombine selected solutions by 
recombination operator 
OMutate new solutions 
O Evaluate new solutions 
Figure 2. GA loop 
 In each population, all individuals have to be evaluated according to their fitness. This means, the value of the objective 
function is calculated for each individual. To select high-quality individuals and to increase the average fitness of the solu-
tions during the GA run, a selection mechanism is necessary. For the GA, we use binary tournament selection of size two 
without replacement [Blickle/Thiele 1995, Harvey 1994, Thierens/Goldberg 1994]. This means, iteratively two individu-
als are randomly chosen from the population and the one individual with higher fitness is selected for recombination and 
copied into an intermediated population (mating pool). Selection is stopped if the mating pool is filled, i.e. the number of 
individuals in the mating pool is the same as the number of individuals in the population. Then, recombination and muta-
tion operators applied to the individuals in the mating pool, resulting in a new generation of individuals.  
Recombination Operator 
During recombination, new solutions are created from the solutions contained in the mating pool. Recombination ran-
domly selects two solutions from the individuals in the mating pool and recombines them with probability P_CO to create 
two new offspring individuals. For recombination, we use the concept of uniform crossover [Beasley/Bull/ Martin 1993], 
i.e., each allele of the offspring is set randomly either to the value of parent1 or parent2. 
To achieve a structural perpetuation of the parental code, the standard uniform crossover has to be extended: if the chosen 
allele of a parent indicates that the corresponding library i is part of consortium l, all other libraries that belong to consor-
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tium l are also part of consortium l in the offspring. Figure 3 illustrates the extended uniform crossover method with an 
example. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic illustration of the extended uniform crossover 
In Figure 2, the first allele of child1 inherits the structural information from parent1 (indicated by 1 in the crossover 
mask). Thus the first, third, and fifth allele of child1 are set to one. Analogously child2 inherits the structural information 
from parent2: the first, second, and fifth allele are set to the value of parent2 (which is also 1). The second allele of child1 
inherits the information from parent2. As the consortium number “1” has already been used, a new consortium number “2” 
is assigned to the second allele of child1. The second allele of child2 and the third allele of child1 are already determined 
by the first inheritance step. The third, fourth, and sixth allele of child2 inherits the structural information of parent2 (indi-
cated by 1 in the crossover mask at the third digit). Finally, the fourth and the sixth allele of child1 are determined by par-
ent2 (indicated by 1 in the crossover mask at the fourth digit). 
In this way, the whole chromosome string of both children can be deduced from the corresponding parents.  
Mutation Operator 
After recombination, a mutation operator is applied to each individual [Goldberg/Deb 1991, Kratica/Filipovic/Tosic 
1998]. In our approach, each allele xi of the individuals in the new population is increased or decreased by 1 with a given 
probability. We assume a constant mutation probability P_Mc =1/(2I) [Schwefel 1981]. The mutation probability depends 
on the string length that is equivalent to the number of libraries I. 
Repair Operator 
When using the representation described above, it is possible that the same solution (phenotype) is represented by differ-
ent solution encodings (genotype). 
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Figure 4. Schematic illustration of the implemented repair operator 
To avoid problems with redundant solutions  [Rothlauf/Goldberg 2003], the individuals of a new generation have to be 
“repaired“ [Gorges-Schleuter 1989, Morris 1998, Rothlauf 2006]. The repair step preserves the structural integrity of each 
individual and re-sorts the values of the alleles in such a way that the alleles are ordered in ascending numbers without 
vacancies. 
Figure 4 gives an example for the repair operator: The second, fourth, fifth, and sixth digit in the un-repaired encoded so-
lution have to be modified so that the alleles are in ascending order. Furthermore, the un-repaired solution does not use the 
procurement entity identifier with the number four which is corrected by the repair algorithm. Both individuals represent 
the same solution of the OCSP (library 1 and 3 are in one consortium, library 4 and 6 in a second, while library 2 and 5 are 
in no consortium this means they do not use co-sourcing for their procurement). 
Performance Test of the Algorithm 
The GA has been implemented in JAVA 1.5. Furthermore, the open source software JAKARTA POI3 was used, which pro-
vides an interconnection between Microsoft EXCEL and Java programs to gather the import data values from Excel data 
sheets.4
Test Environments 
We used four different exemplary instances of the OCSP to evaluate the performance of the GA. All of them are based on 
an empirical data from the HeBiS consortium in 2002. 
 The four test problems are different by two variables: the costs for print subscription and the number of printed copies. 
The costs for the print subscriptions per journal are either set high (empirical value plus a random surplus between € 0 and 
€ 4,000) or low (equal to the empirical value). The number of printed copies is modified randomly (“high” means an equal 
distribution between 0 and 15 for large libraries, 0 and 10 for medium-size libraries, and 0 and 5 for small libraries; “low” 
means an equal distribution between 0 and 3 for large libraries, 0 and 2 for medium-size libraries, and 0 and 1 for small 
libraries). The resulting four test problems are presented in Table 4. The solution space for problem1 is – compared to the 
other problems – very expressive, i.e. the differences between the feasible solutions become apparent. The solution space 
for problem4 is low expressive, i.e. the differences between the feasible solutions do not become apparent leading to a 
very “smooth” fitness landscape [Weinberger 1990]. In general, such in-expressive problem formulations are difficult to 
handle by heuristic methods. Therefore the four test samples show different degrees of difficulty in ascending order from 
problem1 to problem4. Table 5 summarizes properties of the chosen test problems. 
 
3 The POI project consists of APIs for manipulating various file formats based upon Microsoft's OLE 2 Compound Document format using pure Java. 
http://jakarta.apache.org/poi/ (as of 2005-11-08). 
4 The source code can be downloaded at: For ensuring our anonymity in the review process more information will first be provided in the camera-ready 
version. 
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Table 5. Properties of test problems 
Test problem 
name 
Number of 
libraries 
Number of 
journals 
Costs for 
print sub-
scriptions 
Number of 
printed cop-
ies 
Global  
optimum 
problem1 high high 895,411.72 
problem2 high high 772,294.11 
problem3 high low 1,477,717.56 €
problem4 
12 500 
low low 874,892.01 
Furthermore, the following OCSP parameters are used: 
• Relative surcharge for consortia ( ): 0.1 
• Exponent for consortial administrative costs ( ): 1.1 
• Relative surcharge for stand-alone acting for electronic access (  ): 0.05 
• Pay per view fee ( cv): € 10 
• Number of libraries ( I): 12 
• Number of journals ( K ): 500 
 
Due to the small problem size, the global optimum for each test problem can be calculated by an enumeration approach. 
Therefore, the performance of the GA can be compared and evaluated. The enumeration approach is time-consuming and 
it took 9 hours and 45 minutes for each test problem to calculate the optimal solution5. The solution space of the OCSP 
test problem with 12 libraries consists of 4,213,597 feasible solutions. 
Results from GA Approach 
The parameter values used for the GA are: 
• Population size (N): 200 
• Number of Generations (G): 100 
• Crossover probability (P_CO): 0.55  
• Mutation probability (P_Mc): 1/(2I) 
• Termination criteria: number of generations > 100 
The genetic algorithm was repeated 100 times for each test problem. Table 6 summarizes the results. 
 
5 All calculations were executed on a computer system equipped with an AMD processor (2.1 GHz.) and 1 GByte of  RAM.  
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Table 6. GA Performance 
Deviation of best found solution 
compared to the global optimum 
(number of cases) 
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problem1 3.36 0 100 0 0 0 0
problem2 5.19 .03 94 5 1 0 0
problem3 8.93 .05 95 0 4 0 1
problem4 10.98 1.1 67 0 0 15 18 
In the first three problems, the global optimum was found in over 90 % of the runs. The average difference from the global 
optimum is lower than 0.05 %. For problem4, the global optimum was found in 67 runs and the average difference was 
slightly over 1 %. The results confirm that the developed GA is able to find optimal consortia structure with low computa-
tional effort. In comparison to the enumeration approach, the number of fitness evaluations is low as, for example, only 
approximately 2,000 fitness evaluations are necessary to find the optimal solution for problem4 with a probability of about 
65 %. 
Model Application 
The GA is applied to a real-world problem concerning two German consortia (A and B)6 and the journal package of one 
major international publisher in the year 2002. 
Sample Structure 
The journal package is composed of 514 journals (K=514) that focus on different academic disciplines. The two German 
procurement consortia are currently organized on a regional base (each consortium covers only libraries of one German 
state) and are characterized by a heterogeneous library structure. There are I=20 different libraries. Table 7 shows the li-
brary types in the observed case. 
Table 7. Structure of the two German consortia 
State Number of 
small-size 
libraries 
(e.g. UAS 
libraries) 
Number of me-
dium-size librar-
ies 
(e.g. state librar-
ies) 
Number of 
large-size       
libraries 
(e.g. univer-
sity libraries) 
A 4 3 5
B 1 5 2
6 The empirical data were granted under the condition of an anonymous use.  
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Currently, the total costs (for procurement and administration of both consortia) are € 627,149 (compare Figure 5). In this 
example with 20 libraries, 51,724,158,235,372 possible library consortia exist. An evaluation of each feasible solution 
would take over 14,000 years of processing time.7
The further model parameters necessary for the optimization correspond to  = 0.15,  = 0.1 and c v = 10 €/access. These 
parameters correspond to the publisher’s contract conditions.  is set to 1.1, whereas a sensitivity analysis showed that 
the resulting consortia structure is stable for  values between 1.1 and 1.5. 
Results 
The GA was applied 50 times to determine the cost-minimal structure of the exemplary library network. The algorithm 
took around 41 minutes for a single optimization run. 
The cost-minimal structure found by the GA in seven runs results in total costs of € 441,909, which correspond to a cost 
reduction of 29.5 % compared to the solution that is currently established. As outcome, one consortium should be built 
which consists of all small-size, all large-size libraries, and the medium-size libraries with the numbers 6, 10, 11, 13, 15, 
and 16 (procurement entity A’ in Figure 5). The medium-size libraries 14 and 17 should act alone (procurement entities B’ 
and C’ in Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Comparison between regional-based and efficient structure 
The result that libraries 14 and 17 should be in no consortium is due to the fact that the demand for electronic journals at 
these institutions is relatively low. Therefore, the negative effects of being part of a consortium (the multiple-count of print 
subscriptions) are higher than the beneficial effects (cost reduction due to cross access) for both libraries 14 and 17. The 
costs of one consortium, in which all libraries would be involved, would amount to € 469,002.   
Limitations 
The proposed genetic algorithm provides a valid and effective approach to re-organize purchasing structures in the aca-
demic libraries landscape. Nevertheless, although the underlying model is strongly based on empirical conditions, it shows 
some limitations. First, the model addresses only the well-established pricing mechanism, which is based on the print hold-
ings. Although this pricing model is currently the most popular one, the model should be adapted for other models (e.g. 
models which are based on the number of full-time students). Such adjustments can be implemented by reformulating the 
objective function. The GA itself does not have to be altered. Therefore, the adoption of the introduced model should not 
produce major difficulties. 
Second, the optimization model is based on empirical input data, which have to be surveyed or estimated. Especially for 
the prospective usage frequency of a specific journal, a valid estimator must be found. For the problems addressed in this 
work, historical data were used. A valid estimator could be the derivation of the expected usage from similar libraries, 
which already hold an electronic subscription of the relevant journals. 
 
7 This approximated calculation is based on the processing time of the test examples. 
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Third, the introduced administrative cost function is based on the estimation of consortium leaders. In further research 
activities, these values should be surveyed on a wider empirical analysis. Especially the -factor should be deduced from 
further empirical studies. A possible solution for missing data is the application of sensitivity analyses. For example,  can 
be incrementally varied to test how stable the found cost-minimal solution would be. The solution we found for the real-
world problem above is stable for a range of   from 1.1 to 1.5. 
Furthermore, the model is based on the assumption that academic libraries can cooperate flexibly. At least in Germany, the 
structures show a strong state-orientation because of the local funding of academic libraries. Therefore, proposals to re-
form the funding of academic libraries are important for further research. 
Summary 
This paper developed an optimization algorithm for finding cost-minimal consortia structures for libraries. The underlying 
decision model uses a centralized perspective, i.e. individual incentives and goals of the several libraries are not consid-
ered. The cost for the libraries consist of the procurement costs of the libraries and administrative costs which result from 
managing the procurement process and coordinating in the consortia. 
From an economic point of view, library consortia are motivated by lower subscription costs due to the possibility to real-
ize the cross access (economies of scale). Furthermore, administration costs can be reduced by library alliances. The used 
decision model takes both aspects into consideration. Two effects can be observed:  
• With increasing consortium size the benefit of the consortium decreases due to the decreasing value of the cross access 
(economies of scale). 
• With increasing consortium size the administration cost decreases at first and increases at larger consortium sizes. 
In the paper, we developed a genetic algorithm to determine cost-minimal consortia structures. We applied the GA to 
small test problems and a larger real-world problem, which consists of 20 libraries and a journal portfolio of 514 titles. 
The optimal consortia structure found by the GA for the real-world problem has costs that are approximately 30 % lower 
than the currently used consortia structure, which is based on a regional segmentation along state borders. 
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